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Abstract—During a penetration test on the physical se-
curity of an organization, if social engineering is used,
the penetration tester directly interacts with the employees.
These interactions are usually based on deception and if not
done properly can upset the employees, violate their privacy
or damage their trust towards the organization, leading to
law suits and loss of productivity of the organization. This
paper proposes two methodologies for performing a physical
penetration test where the goal is to gain an asset using social
engineering. These methodologies aim to reduce the impact
of the penetration test on the employees. The methodologies
are validated by a set of penetration tests we did in a period
of two years.
Keywords: penetration testing, physical security, method-
ology, social engineering, research ethics
I. Introduction
The strength and alignment of an organization’s secu-
rity mechanisms can be accessed through auditing and
penetration testing. During an audit, the auditor maps
the physical and IT security mechanisms to a standard
such as ISO17799 [1], and determines to what extent the
security of the organization complies with the standard.
When the organization aligns all its security mechanisms
to the standard, it usually performs a penetration test.
In penetration testing, a penetration tester takes an ad-
versarial role and starts attacking the organization until
she achieves a predetermined goal [2, 3]. A successful
attack during the test shows the organization that there
is misalignment between the security mechanisms.
A penetration test can assess both the IT security
and the physical security in the organization. If the
penetration tester assesses the IT security, the goal is to
obtain marked data located deep in the organizations
network. Similarly, if the assessment is on the physical
security, then the goal is to obtain a specific asset, such
as a laptop or a document. During the execution of
a penetration test, if social engineering is allowed, the
tester interacts with the employees as means to achieve
the goal.
Recently, physical penetration testing gains in impor-
tance because of the direct impact of physical theft
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to the digital security of the organization. Marshall et
al. [4] show that in 2008, 25% of the data loss inci-
dents involved a computer theft, affecting more than
6.2 million people. With the proliferation of laptops
and handhold devices this trend will continue, making
physical penetration tests where the goal is to obtain an
asset increasingly gain value.
A physical test executed in combination with social
engineering provides an overview of both the physical
security mechanisms and the level of security aware-
ness of the employees. Measuring the resilience of an
employee against social engineering in physical pene-
tration test is harder than in digital penetration test. In
digital penetration tests the resilience of an employee is
measured indirectly, by making phone queries or send-
ing fake mail that lure the employee to disclose secret
information. Finn and Jakobsson [5] show that such
indirect interaction between the penetration tester and
the employee reduces the ethical impact to a minimal
level while Soghoian [6] shows how these interactions
can be performed while staying within legal boundaries.
However, in physical penetration tests, the tester en-
ters the facility of the organization and directly interacts
with the employees. The absence of any digital medium
in the communication with the employees makes the
interaction between the penetration tester and the em-
ployee personal. When entering the premises, the tester
either deceives the employee, trying to obtain more
information about the goal, or urges the employee to
help her, by letting the tester inside a secure area or
giving the tester a credential.
There are two main consequences from personal in-
teraction between the tester and the employee. First, the
employee might be stressed or not treated with respect.
Second, when helping the penetration tester to enter a
secure location, the employee loses the trust from the
people who reside in the secure location. For example,
employees might stop trusting the secretary when they
find out she let an intruder inside their office. The
penetration test should consider and maintain these trust
relationships.
To avoid ethical and legal implications, organizations
may avoid physical penetration testing with social engi-
neering. Avoiding this type of penetration test leaves the
organization unaware of attacks where the thief uses the
help and information from employees to steal an asset.
This paper tackles the problem how to perform a
physical penetration test using social engineering in the
most respectful manner, while still getting results that
can lead to improving the security of the organization.
The contribution of this paper is two methodologies
for physical penetration tests using social engineering
where the goal is to gain possession of a physical asset
from the premises of the organization. The methodolo-
gies are validated by performing 14 live penetration
tests in the last two years, where students tried to gain
possession of marked laptops placed in buildings of two
universities in Netherlands.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section
2 we present related work and in section 3 we set the
requirements for the methodologies. Sections 4 and 5
outline the methodologies, section 6 provides evaluation
of the structure of the methodologies and section 7
concludes the paper.
II. Related work
In the computer science literature, there are isolated
reports of physical penetration tests using social engi-
neering [7, 8]. However, these approaches focus com-
pletely on the actions of the penetration tester and do
not consider the impact of the test on the employees.
There are a few methodologies for digital penetration
testing. The Open-Source Security Testing Methodology
Manual (OSSTMM) [9] provides an extensive list of what
needs to be checked during a physical penetration test.
However, the methodology does not state how the testing
should be carried out. OSSTMM also does not consider
direct interaction between the penetration tester and the
employees. Barret [10] provides audit-based methodol-
ogy for social engineering using direct interaction be-
tween the penetration tester and an employee. Since this
is an audit-based methodology, the goal is to test all
employees. Our methodologies are goal-based and focus
on the security of a specific physical asset. Employees
are considered as an additional mechanism which can
be circumvented to achieve the goal, instead of being the
goal. Türpe and Eichler [11] focus on safety precautions
while testing production systems. Since a test can harm
the production system, it can cause unforseeable dam-
ages to the organization. In our work the penetration test
of the premises of an organization is seen as a test of a
production system and few of the mechanisms suggested
by Türpe and Eichler are visible in our methodologies.
Our approach focuses on the order of executing the
mechanisms and their effect on the environment.
In the crime science community, Cornish [12] provides
mechanisms how to structure multiple crimes into uni-
versal crime scripts and reasons about mechanisms how
to prevent them. We adopt a similar reporting format to
present the results from a penetration test. However, in-
stead of using the crime scripts to structure the multiple
attacks, we use the scripts to isolate security mechanisms
that continuously fail or succeed in stopping an attack.
In social research, the Bellman report [13] defines the
ethical guidelines for protection of humans in testing.
The first guideline in the report states that all partic-
ipants should be treated with respect during the test.
Finn [14] provides four justifications that need to be
satisfied to use deception in research. We use the same
justifications to show that our methodology is ethically
sound.
III. Requirements
A penetration test should satisfy five requirements
to be useful for the organization. First, the penetration
test needs to be realistic, since it simulates an attack
performed by a real adversary. Second, during the test all
employees need to be treated with respect [13]. The em-
ployees should not be stressed, feel uncomfortable nor
be at risk during the penetration test, because they might
get disappointed from the organization, become disgrun-
tled or even start legal action. Finally, the penetration test
should be repeatable, reliable and reportable [10]. We call
these the R* requirements:
Realistic - employees should act normally, as they
would in everyday life.
Respectful - the test is done ethically, by respecting the
employees and the mutual trust between employees.
Reliable - the penetration test does not cause produc-
tivity loss of employees.
Repeatable - the same test can be performed several
times and the if the environment does not change, the
results should be the same.
Reportable - all actions during the test should be logged
and the outcome of the test should be in a form that per-
mits a meaningful and actionable document of findings
and recommendations.
These are conflicting requirements. For example:
In a realistic test penetration test, it might be necessary to
deceive an employee, which is not respectful. The employees
should not be aware of the test taking place. The moment
the employee is informed about the penetration test, she
will stop reacting normally, making the test not realistic.
Deceiving employees is clearly not respectful.
In a realistic test, arbitrary employees might be social
engineered to achieve the goal, which is unreliable. Free-
dom of approaching arbitrary people gives opportunity
to the penetration tester to spontaneously adapt her
strategy during the execution of the test. However, the
penetration tester cannot foresee the outcome of these
interactions, making the test unreliable.
In a reportable test, all actions of the penetration tester need
to be logged, which is unrealistic. The tester should provide
evidence of all actions which contribute to achieving the
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Figure 1. Sequence of events in the first methodology. Each box represents an event which happens in sequence or parallel with other events.
For example, event 3 happens after event 2 and in parallel with events 1 and 4.
goal, through recording her actions with logging equip-
ment such as microphones or cameras. This information
is used both to repeat the test and to prove the tester
was not harassing the employees. Logging equipment
conflicts with two requirements. First, the burden of
carrying additional devices reduces the set of available
attacks to the tester, making the test less realistic. Second,
the employee does not know she is recorded without
her knowledge, which is not ethical and in some cases
illegal [15].
Orchestrating a penetration test is striking the best
balance between the conflicting requirements. If the
balance is not achieved, the test might either not fully
assess the security of the organization or might harm the
employees.
IV. First methodology
We propose two methodologies for conducting a pene-
tration test using social engineering. In both methodolo-
gies the goal of the test is to gain possession of a target
asset.
In the first methodology, the owner of the asset is
aware that the test takes place. This makes the method-
ology suitable for tests where the owner is out of scope
of the test, such as in tests assessing the security of
the laptop belonging to the CEO or the security of
equipment in storage areas.
In the following sections, first we define the actors
in the first methodology. Then, we introduce all events
that take place during the setup, execution and after the
penetration test. Finally, we validate the methodology
by conducting three penetration tests and present some
insights from the experience.
 




	

















fffi
fl
fiff

fi

Figure 2. Actors in the first methodology
A. Actors
The penetration test consists of four different authors.
Security officer - an employee responsible for the secu-
rity of the organization. The security officer orchestrates
the penetration test.
Custodian - an employee who owns the assets, sets up
and monitors the penetration test.
Penetration tester - an employee or a contractor trying
to gain possession of the asset without being caught.
Employee - person in the organization who has none
of the roles above.
The actors and the relations between them are shown
in Figure 2. The majority of actors treat each other with
respect. No respect relation between two actors means
either the actors do not interact during the penetration
test (for example between the tester and the custodian)
or do not have a working relationship (between the pen-
etration tester and the employee). In this methodology,
the tester deceives the employee during the penetration
test, presented in the figure with a red dashed line.
1. Social engineer night pass from an employee.
2. Enter the building early in the morning.
3. Social engineer the cleaning lady to access the office.
4. Cut any protection on the laptop using a bolt cutter.
5. Leave the building during office hours.
Figure 3. Example of an attack scenario
B. Setup
Figure 1 provides the sequence of events that take
place during the setup, execution and closure of the pen-
etration test. During all three stages of the penetration
test, employees should behave normally (1 in Figure 1).
As in other penetration testing methodologies, before
the start of the test, the security officer sets the scope,
the rules of engagement and the goal (2 in Figure 1). The
goal is gaining physical possession of a marked asset. The
scope of the testing provides the penetration tester with a
set of locations she is allowed to enter, as well as business
processes in the organization she can abuse, such as
processes for issuing a new password, or processes for
adding/removing an employee. The rules of engagement
restrict the penetration tester to the tools and means she
is allowed to use to reach the target. These rules, for
example, define if the tester is allowed to force doors, to
break windows or to use social engineering.
The custodian first signs an informed consent and then
sets up the environment, by marking an asset in her pos-
session and installing monitoring equipment. The asset
should not be critical for the daily tasks of the custodian.
Thus, when the penetration tester gains possession of the
asset, the productivity of the custodian using the asset
will not be affected. The custodian leaves the asset in her
office or an area without people (storage area, closet). If
the custodian shares an office with other employees, the
monitoring equipment should be positioned in such a
way that it records only the asset and not the nearby
employees. The custodian knows when the test takes
place, and has sufficient time to remove/obscure all
sensitive and private assets in her room and around the
marked asset (3 in Figure 1).
Meanwhile, the penetration tester needs to sign the
rules of engagement (4 in Figure 1). The rules of en-
gagement should include the following:
1) Each attack scenario needs to be approved by the
custodian and the security officer.
2) The penetration tester should not harm nor intim-
idate any employee.
3) The penetration tester should not damage any
property.
C. Execution
The execution stage of the penetration test depends
mainly on the skills and experience of the penetration
tester. The security officer should choose a trustworthy
penetration tester and monitor her actions during the
execution stage.
When the penetration test starts, the tester first scouts
the area and proposes a set of attack scenarios (5 in
Figure 1). An example of an attack scenario is presented
in Figure 3. The proposed attack scenarios need to be
approved first by the custodian (6 in Figure 1) and then
by the security officer (7 in Figure 1). The custodian is
directly involved in the test and can correctly judge the
effect of the scenario on her daily tasks and the tasks of
her colleagues. The security officer needs to approve the
scenarios because she is aware of the general security of
the organization and can better predict the far-reaching
consequences of the actions of the tester.
After approval from the custodian and the security
officer, the tester starts with the execution of the attack
scenarios (8 in Figure 1). The custodian and the security
officer remotely monitor the execution (9 in Figure 1)
through CCTV and the monitoring equipment installed
by the custodian.
The penetration tester needs to install wearable moni-
toring equipment to log her actions. The logs serve three
purposes. First, they ensure that if an employee is treated
with disrespect there is objective evidence. Second, the
logs prove that the penetration tester has followed the
attack scenarios, and finally, the logs provide informa-
tion how the mechanisms were circumvented, helping
the organization repeat the scenario if needed.
D. Closure
After the end of the test, the penetration tester pre-
pares a report containing a list of attack traces. Each
attack trace contains information of successful or un-
successful attack (10 in Figure 1). Based on the report,
the security officer debriefs both the custodians and the
deceived employees (11 in Figure 1).
Reporting. The attack traces are structured in a report
that emphasizes the weak and the strong security mech-
anisms encountered during the penetration test. In the
crime science community, there are 25 techniques for
situational crime prevention [16]. For different domains
there are extensive lists of security mechanisms to en-
force the 25 techniques (for example, [17]). The combi-
nation of the attack traces together with the situational
crime prevention techniques gives an overview of the
circumvented mechanisms [18].
Figure 4 shows an example of a generic script instan-
tiated with an attack trace. First we define the generic
script, which encompasses the stages of all attacks. In
the example, they are: enter the building, enter the office,
identify and get the laptop, and exit the building. For
each step in a trace, we identify both the mechanisms
(if any) that were circumvented and mechanisms that
stopped an attack. For failed attacks, the table shows
which mechanisms were circumvented up to the failed
Generic Script Attack trace Circumvented
mechanisms
Successful
mechanisms
Recommendations
Prepare for the at-
tack
Buy a bolt cutter and hide it
in a bag. Scout the building
and the office during working
hours.
Obtain an after working hours
access card.
Access control of the
building entrances dur-
ing working hours.
Credential sharing pol-
icy.
Keep entrance doors to
the building locked at
all time.
Provide an awareness
training concerning cre-
dential sharing.
Enter the building Enter the building at 7:30 AM,
before working hours.
Hide the face from CCTV at
the entrance using a hat.
CCTV pre-theft surveil-
lance.
Increase the awareness
of the security guards
during non-working
hours.
Enter the office Wait for the cleaning lady.
Pretend you are an employee
who forgot the office key and
ask the cleaning lady to open
the office for you.
Challenge unknown
people to provide ID.
Credential sharing pol-
icy.
Reward employees for
discovering intruders.
Identify and get the
laptop
Search for the specific laptop.
Get the bolt cutter from the
bag and cut the Kensington
lock. Put the laptop and the
bolt cutter in the bag.
A.1 Kensington lock. Get stronger Kensing-
ton locks. Use alterna-
tive mechanism for pro-
tecting the laptop.
Leave the building
with the laptop
Leave the building at 8:00,
when external doors automat-
ically unlock for employees.
CCTV surveillance.
Access control of the
building entrances dur-
ing working hours.
The motion detection
of the CCTV cameras
needs to be more sensi-
tive .
Figure 4. Reporting the results.
action, and the mechanism that successfully stopped the
attempt.
After structuring all attack scenarios in this format,
for each generic step we get a list of the mechanisms
which were commonly circumvented, and the mecha-
nisms which stopped the most attacks.
Debriefing the employees and the custodian. The interac-
tion between the penetration tester and the employee
might be a stressful event, in which the penetration tester
makes the employee bend or violate a policy of the
organization. After finding they were deceived by the
same organization they work for, the employees might
get disappointed or disgruntled. At the end of the test
the security officer fully debriefs the custodian and the
employees. The debriefing should be done carefully, to
maintain or restore the trust between custodian and the
employees who helped the tester to gain the asset.
E. Validation
We orchestrated three penetration tests using the first
methodology. As penetration testers, we used three
teams of master students who were instructed to steal
three laptops from the custodian (the first author). We
locked the laptops with Kensington locks and hid the
keys in an office desk. To monitor the laptops, we
installed motion detection web cameras which streamed
live feeds to an Internet server. Since the custodian
shares the office with four other colleagues, the cameras
were positioned in such a way to preserve the privacy
of the colleagues. We told the colleagues we are doing
an experiment, but we did not reveal the nature nor the
goal of the experiment.
Since we knew about the penetration test, we did not
allow the students to gain possession of the laptops in
our presence. During the experiment, we carried on the
normal work, thus the students were forced to carry
on the attacks after working hours or during the lunch
break.
The three teams first scouted the building and wrote
a list of attack scenarios they want to execute. At the
beginning the students tried to gain the laptops through
the secretary and the colleagues from the office. How-
ever, none of them agreed to hand in a laptop without
permission from the custodian. In desperation, one of
the teams asked the security guard of the building. The
strategy was to directly go to the security guard and
provide a fake e-mail stating the students are authorized
to pick up the laptop. The guard believed the story
and opened the door for the students. The rest of the
teams followed the same strategy and social engineered
the same guard. At the end of the test, all three teams
successfully obtained the target laptops.
Later, all teams wrote the successful and unsuccessful
attempts in the format shown in Figure 4. After the
penetration test, we individually debriefed the security
officer, the security guard, the secretary and the col-
leagues.
F. Lessons learned from the penetration tests
The analysis of the actions that took place before,
during and after the penetration test, lead us to the
following observations:
1) The attack scenarios should be flexible: Although the
students provided scenarios prior to all attacks, in all
cases they were forced to deviate from them, because
the target employee was either not present or was not
behaving as expected. Attack scenarios assure the cus-
todian and the security officer that the actions of the
penetration tester are in the scope of the test, but at
the same time they need to be considered more as a
framework than as a specific sequence of steps.
2) The methodology does not respect the trust relationship
between the custodian and the employees: After the pene-
tration test, the custodian knows which employees were
deceived, and the trust relationship between them is
shaken. For example, if the secretary lets the penetration
tester inside the office of the custodian, the custodian
might not be able to trust her again. We concluded that
in some instances it would be better to hide from the
custodian who contributed to the asset loss. We address
this problem in the second methodology.
3) During the penetration test, separating the custodian
from the employees is hard: Whenever the students ap-
proached a colleague from the office, the first reaction
of the colleague was to call the custodian and ask for
guidance. This led to uncomfortable situations where we
were forced to shut down our phones and ignore e-mails
while outside the office.
4) Debriefing proved to be very difficult: After the test,
we fully disclosed the test to all involved employees.
Debriefing the security guard who opened the office
for the penetration testers three times was the hardest.
During the debriefing we focussed on the benefits of the
penetration test to the university and their help setting
up the test. After the debriefing, we concluded that we
caused more stress to the guard during the debriefing
than the students had caused during the penetration test.
5) Forbidding the penetration testers to damage property
is too restricting: For example, the price of a Kensington
lock is small. In a real scenario, the thief would cut the
lock instead of trying to locate the correct key and social
engineer it from an employee.
V. Second methodology
In the first methodology, the custodian is aware of
the penetration test. The knowledge of the penetration
test changes her normal behavior and thus influences
the results of the test. Since the asset belongs to the
custodian, and the asset is in the office of the custodian,
in many environments it is desirable to include the
custodian’s resistance to social engineering as part of the
test.
After performing the first series of penetration tests,
we revisited and expanded the first methodology. The
second methodology can be seen as a refinement of the
first methodology, based on the experience from the first
set of penetration tests. In the second methodology the
custodian is not aware of the test, making the second
methodology suitable for penetration tests where the
goal is to check the overall security of an area including
the level of security awareness of the custodian.
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Figure 6. Actors in the second methodology
A. Actors
There are six actors in the second methodology.
Security officer - an employee responsible for the secu-
rity of the organization.
Coordinator - an employee or contractor responsible
for the experiment and the behavior of the penetration
tester. The coordinator orchestrates the whole penetra-
tion test.
Penetration tester - an employee or contractor who
attempts to gain possession of the asset without being
caught.
Contact person - an employee who provides logistic
support in the organization and a person to be contacted
in case of an emergency.
Custodian - an employee at whose office the asset
resides. The custodian should behave normally during
the whole penetration test (1 in Figure 5).
Employee - person in the organization who has none
of the roles above. The employee should also behave
normally during the penetration test (2 in Figure 5).
Figure 6 shows the actors and the relations between
them. In this methodology, the penetration tester de-
ceives both, the employees and the custodian. Moreover,
the contact person also needs to deceive the custodian.
These relations are discussed in greater depth in section
VI.
B. Setup
At the beginning, similar to the first methodology, the
security officer initializes the test by defining the target,
scope and the rules of engagement. The security officer at
this point assigns a coordinator for the penetration test
and provides the coordinator with marked assets and
equipment for monitoring the assets (3 in Figure 5). The
marked assets should be similar to the asset of interest
for which the security is measured. The monitoring
equipment should be non-intrusive and its purpose is to
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Figure 5. Sequence of events in the second methodology
have an additional information on the activities of the
penetration tester.
The rules of engagement are similar to the first
methodology. The difference is in the third rule which
forbids the penetration tester to damage property:
The penetration tester can damage property of
the organization up to a certain threshold.
The threshold value defines to which extent the pen-
etration tester can use force in circumventing specific
mechanisms. The damage is localized only to property
of the organization. An additional rule is:
The penetration tester should immediately
abort the test, whenever an abortion condition
is met.
The abortion conditions are defined by the security
officer. The penetration tester should sign these rules of
engagement before the start of the execution stage (4 in
Figure 5).
The coordinator selects a number of contact people
and provides them with the marked assets and the
monitoring equipment (5 in Figure 5). Furthermore, the
coordinator provides a cover story which explains why
the custodian is given the asset. The contact person se-
lects a number of custodians based on the requirements
from the security officer (random, specific roles, specific
characteristics) and distributes the marked assets and the
monitoring equipment to the custodians. After giving
the monitoring equipment, the contact person should
get a signed informed consent from the custodians (6
in Figure 5). If the asset can store data, the document
must clearly state that the custodian should not store
any sensitive nor private data in the asset.
Before the penetration test starts, the coordinator dis-
tributes a list of penetration testers to the security officer,
and a list of asset locations to the penetration tester (7
in Figure 5).
C. Execution
The first steps of the execution stage are similar to the
previous methodology. The penetration tester scouts the
area and proposes attack scenarios (8 in Figure 5). The
coordinator and later the security officer should agree
with these scenarios before the tester starts executing
them (9 and 10 in Figure 5). After approval from both
actors, the tester starts executing the attack scenarios. If a
penetration tester is caught or a termination condition is
reached, the penetration tester immediately informs the
contact person. Thus, if the custodian stored sensitive
data in the asset, the data is not exposed.
When the penetration tester gains possession of the
target asset, the tester informs the contact person and
the coordinator and returns the asset to the contact
person (11 in Figure 5). The contact person collects the
monitoring equipment and informs the security officer
(12 in Figure 5). If the tester gains possession of the asset
without the knowledge of the custodian, the contact
person needs to reach the custodian before the custodian
reaches the office and explain to the custodian that the
test is terminated. The security officer obtains surveil-
lance videos from the CCTV and access logs and gives
them to the coordinator (13 in Figure 5).
D. Closure
After the execution stage, the penetration tester writes
a report of all attempts, both failed and successful, in the
form of attack traces and gives them to the coordinator
(14 in Figure 5). The coordinator has two tasks. First, she
collects the marked assets and monitoring equipment
from the contact person (15 in Figure 5) and returns them
to the security officer. Second, the coordinator debriefs
the security officer and the custodians and provides the
custodian a form of reward for helping in the assessment
(16 in Figure 5).
Not all employees that were social engineered should
be debriefed. Employees who were treated with respect
and to whom the penetration tester did not cause dis-
comfort during the interaction should not be debriefed,
because the debriefing can cause more stress than the in-
teraction with the penetration tester. The decision which
employees need to be debriefed lies with the security
officer, and is based on the logs from the penetration
tester and the monitoring equipment.
Debriefing the custodians. All custodians should be de-
briefed, because they sign an informed consent at the
beginning of the test. However, to preserve the trust
between the custodian and the employees, the custodian
should not know which employee contributed to the
attack.
Three elements should be considered before the de-
briefing. First, the custodians were deceived by the
organization they work for (more specifically, by the con-
tact person). Second, in case of direct interaction, their
privacy might be violated by the logging equipment
from the tester. Third, they might be stressed from the
penetration test either directly, through interaction with
the penetration tester, or indirectly, by finding their asset
is gone before the contact person reaches them.
The debriefing should focus on the contribution of the
custodian in finding the security vulnerabilities in the
organization, and the custodian should be rewarded for
the participation.
E. Validation
We orchestrated eleven penetration tests with the sec-
ond methodology. As targets we used eleven marked
laptops that just came out on the market. We selected
three PhD students (friends of the author) as contact
persons, who chose eleven friends as custodians. The
custodians were ten PhD students and one professor
spread across two universities who worked in nine
different buildings.
We gave the laptops to the custodians for two weeks
usage. The cover story was that the universities are in-
terested in the usability of the new generation of laptops.
Thus, we need to monitor the behavior of the custodian
and measure their satisfaction level. The contact persons
explained that they cannot tell the custodians exactly
which behavior we measure, since it might change the
results of the experiment. We instructed the custodians to
lock the laptops with Kensington lock and to keep them
in the office. To reduce the risk of data leakage and loss
of productivity, we asked the custodians not to store any
private or work data on the laptops. Later, thirty-three
master students in computer security, divided in eleven
teams of three, tried to gain possession of the laptops by
using physical and social means.
The favorite approach of the students was to directly
confront the custodian and ask for the laptop. The
students took roles as service desk employees, students
that urgently need a laptop for a few hours or claimed
they were sent by the coordinator. The students used
mobile phones and pocket video cameras to record the
conversation with the employees. In one case they took
a professional camera and a cameraman, and told the
custodian the recording is part of a study to measure
the service quality of the service desk.
The resistance of the employees varied. In five cases,
the employees gave the laptop easily after being showed
fake email and being promised they will get the laptop
back in a few hours. In two cases the custodian wanted
a confirmation from a supervisor or the coordinator. The
students succeeded in the attempt because the custodian
called a number provided by the students. Needles to
say, the number was of another team member disguised
as the coordinator. In one case a colleague of the cus-
todian got suspicious and sent an email to the campus
security. Since only the main security officer knew about
the penetration test, in few hours the security guards
were all alerted and started searching for suspicious
students.
However, in two cases the students were not able to
social engineer the custodian directly and were forced
to look for alternative approaches. For example, in one
of the cases the students entered the building before
working hours. At this time the cleaning lady cleans the
offices, and under the assumption it is their office let the
students inside. After entering the office, the students
cut the Kensington lock and left the building before the
custodian arrived.
We debriefed only the custodians through a group
presentation, where we explained the penetration test
and its goal. During all penetration tests, there were no
incidents and none of the employees complained about
stressful situations.
F. Lessons learned from the validation
1) We should specify in advance which information can be
used by the penetration tester: For example, the penetration
tester should not use knowledge about the cover story
used by the contact person. During the validation, six
penetration testers used knowledge of the cover story
to convince the custodian to hand in the laptop. Thus,
these tests were less realistic.
2) Panic situations need to be taken into consideration in
the termination conditions: Several times the custodian or
an employee got suspicious and raised an alarm. Since
only the security officer knew about the experiment, and
the other security personal was excluded, news of people
stealing laptops spread in a matter of hours.
3) The penetration test cannot be repeated many times:
If a custodian participated in the penetration test once,
she knows what will happen. The same holds for the
employees she told about the experiments and the em-
ployees that were socially engineered.
4) The custodian does not behave the same toward its own
asset and the acquired asset, making the test less realistic:
During the penetration test, we noticed the security
awareness of the custodians is low towards the marked
asset than to assets she owns for a longer period of time.
We assume the custodian does not consider the asset
as her belonging and is more willing to give it away.
If the marked asset is given a few months before the
penetration test starts, we believe the custodian will care
of the asset as if the asset belongs to her.
VI. Evaluation
There are two main elements that define to which
extent the penetration test satisfies the requirements:
the rules of engagement and the pre-approval of each
attack scenario. Less restrictive rules of engagement and
approving more invasive attack scenarios make the pen-
etration test more realistic, but make the test less reliable
and respectful to the employees. The evaluation below
assumes these elements are tuned to the risk appetite of
the organization and focuses only on the structure of the
methodologies.
Reliable: In the first methodology, the penetration
tester gains possession of a non-critical asset which the
custodian is prepared to lose. Thus, the result of the
penetration test will not affect the productivity of the
custodian. In the second methodology, the productivity
of the custodian can be affected since the custodian does
not know the asset will be stolen. The informed consent
she signs, explicitly states not to use the marked asset for
daily tasks nor store sensitive information on the asset.
The productivity of other employees is not affected, since
the penetration tester does not gain possession of any of
their belongings without their approval.
Repeatable: The repeatability of any penetration test
using social engineering is questionable, since human
behavior is unpredictable. Checking if a penetration test
is repeatable would require a larger set of tests on a
single participant, and a larger number of participants
in the test.
Reportable: The approach used in reporting the results
of the penetration test completely covers all information
needed to perform the attack in a real-life situation
and provides an overview of what should be improved
to thwart such attempts. The logs from the tester and
the monitoring equipment installed by the custodians
provide detailed information on all actions taken by the
penetration tester, giving a clear overview of how the
mechanisms are circumvented.
Respectful: Both methodologies should respect all the
employees and the trust relationships between them.
Methodology I Methodology II
Reliable +++ ++
Repeatable - -
Reportable +++ +++
Respectful: actors ++ +
Respectful: trust relations - ++
Realistic + +++
Figure 7. Evaluation of both methodologies
In physical penetration testing, the social engineering
element is much more intense than in digital penetration
testing because the interaction between the penetration
tester and the employee is direct, without using any
digital medium. Baumrind [19] considers deception of
subjects in testing as unethical. The National Commis-
sion for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical
and Behavioral Research, clearly states in their first rule
of ethical principles: "Respect for persons" [13].
However, in some tests deception cannot be avoided,
and Finn [14] defines four justifications that need to be
met do make deception acceptable: (1) The assessment
cannot be performed without the use of deception. (2)
The knowledge obtained from the assessment has impor-
tant value. (3) The test involves no more than minimal
risk and does not violate the rights and the welfare of the
individual. Minimal risk is defined as: "the probability
and magnitude of physical or psychological harm that is
normally encountered in the daily lives" [20]. (4) Where
appropriate, the subjects are provided with relevant
information about the assessment after participating in
the test. Physical penetration testing using social engi-
neering can never be completely respectful because it
is based on deception. However, the deception in both
methodologies presented in this paper is justifiable.
The first two justifications are general for penetration
testing and its benefits, and have been discussed earlier
in the literature (for example, [10]).
The third justification states that the risk induced
by the test should be no greater than the risks we
face in daily lives. In the first methodology, the only
actor at risk is the employee. The penetration tester
cannot physically harm the employee because of the
rules of engagement, thus only psychological harm is
possible. If the employees help the penetration tester
voluntarily, the risk of psychological harm is minimal.
The logging equipment assures the interaction can be
audited in a case of dispute. In the second methodology,
an additional actor at risk is the custodian. The only
case when the risk is above minimal for the custodian
is if the tester gains possession of the laptop without
custodian’s knowledge. When the custodian finds the
laptop missing, her stress level might increase. Therefore
it is crucial for the contact person to reach the custodian
before custodian gets to her office.
The fourth justification states that all actors should be
debriefed after the exercise. In both methodologies, all
actors except the employees are either fully aware of
the exercise, or have signed an informed consent and
are debriefed after the exercise. Similarly to Fin and
Jakobsson [5], we argue that there should be selective
debriefing of the employees. The risk for the employees
during the penetration test is minimal. Debriefing can
make the employee upset and disgruntled and is the
only event where the risk is higher then minimal. Thus,
an employee should be debriefed only if the security
officer constitutes the tester did more than minimal
harm.
Besides being respectful towards the participants, the
methodology needs to maintain the trust relations be-
tween the employees. The first methodology affects the
trust between the custodian and the employees and the
employees and the organization. This is a consequence
of the decision to fully debrief all participants in the
test. The second methodology looks at reducing these
impacts. First, the custodians are not told who con-
tributed to the attack. Only the coordinator and the
security officer have this information, and they are not
related to the custodian. Second, the employees are not
informed about the penetration test unless it deemed
necessary. However, the trust between the custodian
and the contact person is shaken. Therefore, the contact
person and the custodian should not know each other
prior to the test.
In conclusion, the second methodology is less respect-
ful to the custodian than the first methodology, because
the custodian is deceived and might get stressed when
she finds out the asset is gone. The first methodology
does not preserve any trust between the employees, the
organization and the custodian. The second method-
ology preserves the trust bond between the custodian
and the employees and between the employees and
the organization. However, the trust bond between the
custodian and the contact person may be affected.
Realistic: The first methodology allows testing the re-
silience to social engineering of employees in the organi-
zation. Since the custodian knows about the penetration
test, she is not directly involved during the execution
of the test, making this methodology implementable in
limited number of situations.
In the second methodology, neither the custodian nor
any of the other employees know about the penetration
test, making the test more realistic.
VII. Conclusion
We present two methodologies for penetration test-
ing using social engineering. The second methodology
was developed after validating the first methodology,
thus in many aspects it improves on it. However, the
first methodology is more reliable, does not deceive
the custodian and fully debriefs all actors in the test.
We present here both methodologies, leaving to the
organization to decide which one is more appropriate
for its environment.
This paper shows that performing physical penetra-
tion tests using social engineering can reduce the impact
on employees in the organization, and still provide
meaningful and useful information on the security of the
organization. We validate the methodologies by perform-
ing 14 tests and evaluate them using five requirements.
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